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The paper addresses preferential trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific with the objective of identifying their 
characteristics, which can be useful in assessing the effects of their implementation. The paper relies mostly on the 
Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database (APTIAD) in sourcing data and information for analysis. 
On 26 February 2007 APTIAD was tracking 125 preferential trade agreements one party of which was a member of 
ESCAP.  Eighty seven of those agreements of various types are in force, 62 of them being bilateral agreements, 11 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), and 11 agreements between  country and bloc (the residual is made up of 
agreements of different scope, e.g.  global, and country-plurilateral, etc.). The paper utilizes factual information on 
membership and coverage of agreements as well as statistical data on goods trade flows in discussing selected 
important aspects of preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific: (a) the rapid proliferation of preferential trade and 
revealed preference for bilateral links; (b) strong tolerance for an engagement in multiple trade agreements with the 
same trading partner; and (c) reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise trade, and expose 
other trade areas apart from goods to preferential liberalization. Penultimate section discusses ways in which PTAs 
could be harnessed to work as complementary with the multilateral trading regime. Paper offers some policy 
recommendations in area of preferential trade negotiation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Preferential trade liberalization
2  dominates current trade liberalization. While unilateral 
liberalization has occupied the pedestal of orthodox trade theory since Adam Smith,
3 and while 
multilateral liberalization won the hearts of politicians in the second half of the twentieth century, 
preferential trade liberalization has been embraced by free trade pragmatists
4 (who prefer to be 
called realists) from all stakeholder groups since 1990s.  
 
Derived from concessions (preferences) that existed in trade between colonies and the 
imperial powers (such as British Imperial Preferences), concessions in the modern trade scene are 
extended through various channels with  variable margins of preference to selected countries.
5 
These comprise (a) eligible developing countries, for example, the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP); (b) the least developed countries, for example, Everything but Arms, (EBA); 
(c) countries fighting a war against drugs or terrorism; and (d) countries/members of the same trade 




Countries that are non-receivers of preferences can interpret trade preferences given only to 
selected countries as trade discrimination. It is for this reason that the founders of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) installed the most favoured nation (MFN) system as the 
fundamental principle of the multilateral trading system. MFN assured that concessions given to 
any signatories of the then GATT had to be extended to other parties.
7 Nevertheless, part of the 
original GATT rules (Part III) included articles on the formation of CUs and free trade areas 
(GATT Article XXIV) exempting countries forming such agreements from having to apply the 
MFN clause. Later, during the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the Enabling Clause was adopted. It 
legalized partial trade preferences among developing countries and non-reciprocal partial 
preferences by developed to developing countries.
8 MFN treatment could still be seen as having a 
discriminatory impact since it allows less favourable treatment of non-members. As membership in 
the multilateral trading system has increased more than five-fold from that at its establishment in 
1947, trade concessions under the MFN today should apply to all countries that feature in the world 
trade because some members also extend them (unilaterally and conditionally) to selected non-
members.
9 The fact, however, is that the parallel rise in the number of free trade deals and other 
                                                 
2 The term “preferential trade liberalization”, “preferential trade” and “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) are used 
loosely to refer to a wide variety of agreements also classed as “regional trade agreements” (RTAs). It should be noted 
that members of RTAs are not always in geographical proximity. The term “regional integration” is used in this paper as 
a synonym for RTAs. 
3 While theory labels a unilateral path to liberalization as superior under certain conditions, not many governments choose 
to take it. This reluctance appears to have become stronger in recent times. See also Sally (2007). 
4 Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p.13) is one of many to have commented on the fact that: “PTAs came to be seen as a 
pragmatic, second-best approach to advancing liberalization at a time when the multilateral route seemed slow to deliver 
and unilateral liberalization was politically difficult.” See also Emmerson (2005) for a political science perspective.  
5 Non-trade concessions or non-economic benefits are not directly addressed in this paper. Throughout the paper, the 
words “country”, “nation” and “economy” are used as though they are synonymous.  
6 According to Grether and Olarreaga (1998), 42 per cent of world trade during 1993-1997 was preferential; the share was 
as high as 70 per cent for Western Europe, and as low as 4 per cent for Asia and Oceania. Crawford and Fiorentino 
(2005) estimated that preferential trade comprised 90 per cent of some countries’ trade. See also G.C. Hufbauer and Y. 
Wong (2005). D. Medvedev (2006) uses different approach in his calculation which does not support this claim. 
7 “(…) any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by such country to any product originating in any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to a like product originating in the territories of all other 
Members.” GATT Article I. 
8  See also Limão (2006) for a comparison of the Enabling Clause and GATT Art. XXIV on the requirements of 
preferences. It turns out that the Enabling Clause is more restrictive as it requires that preferences “shall not constitute an 
impediment to the reduction of elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a MFN basis”. Limão shows that 
the American and the European GSP schemes impede their multilateral liberalization under MFN.  
9 Cf. Deardorff and Stern (2005), p.6. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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trade arrangements have, in effect, made MFN appearing as an exceptional treatment.
10 
Nonetheless, MFN treatment, as it is extended unconditionally to all members of the WTO, 
remains a standard or benchmark for non-preferential and non-discriminatory trade.  
 
The Asian and Pacific region is no stranger to preferential trade. The Silk Road and trade 
in spices were developed with trade concessions. During the GATT era, however, preferences 
extended through trade agreements were not very evident in Asia and the Pacific. Following the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
readiness to liberalize trade through channels other than mainstream multilateral liberalization 
became much stronger. Thus, as a matter of choice, Asian and Pacific region countries embraced 
bilateral and other trade arrangements that very quickly produced a situation of entangled and 
overlapping preferential rules that have been informally named “Asian noodles”. This “Asian 
noodle bowl” situation closely mimics the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon associated with the trade 
relations between Europe and its trading partners.
11  
  
This paper relies mostly on data from the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements 
Database (APTIAD). Currently, APTIAD provides information on 125 agreements involving at 
least one member economy from the United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Asia and 
the Pacific, (ESCAP) region. This paper only focuses on 87 agreements that are already in force at 
the time of its preparation.
12 
 
The reminder of the introduction provides an overview of relevant terminology by 
discussing PTA taxonomy. It also reviews some stylized facts of the Asia-Pacific regionalism to 
frame the analysis in the rest of the paper, which includes four sections.  Section I identifies major 
developments in preferential trade, with focus on overall number and types of the agreements. The 
birds-eye view provides a point of departure, beginning with the volume of trade and the proportion 
of ESCAP member countries involved in preferential trade. While the objective of the paper is to 
provide a map of preferential trade in the region, it is also important to consider the motivation of 
countries in negotiating trade agreements at multiple levels. This is discussed in section II. Section 
III explores trade agreements with respect to their policy commitments and coverage of trade 
liberalization in terms of goods and other standard areas of cooperation, in an attempt to assess the 
gap between these ‘real world’ agreements and the ‘best practice’ principles. This is done in 
Section IV, which also offers some recommendations to policymakers on the negotiations front.   
1.2 Taxonomy  
International trade textbooks use the black-and-white approach in defining various forms 
of preferential trade. Standard taxonomy is reflected in a matrix such as that given in table 1. 
 


































                                                 
10 The Sutherland Report (p. 19) (World Trade Organization, 2004) suggests that MFN could be “…defined as LFN 
(Least-Favoured Nation) treatment. But in fact difficulties associated with utilization of preferences make an MFN a 
pragmatic regime often used in practice. 
11 The term “spaghetti bowl” is credited to Bhagwati (1992). Cf. Mikic (2002) and Findlay and Pangestu (2001). 
12 Only 57 out of  these 87 agreements are notified to the World Trade Organization – see more details on APTIAD. For 
full titles of the agreements, see the list of abbreviations. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
   
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 6 of 59 
Free trade 
area 
+       
Customs 
union 
+ +      
Common 
market 
+ + +    
Economic 
union 
+ + + +  
Monetary 
union 
+ + + + + 
Note: + indicates members’ full commitment to reaching targets stated at the top of columns; area = 
agreement. 
 
In the real world, however, there are also shades of white and black. WTO (through GATT 
Article XXIV) persists in using only the types that fit into the above scheme (free trade area and 
CU). If one searches APTIAD (or other regionally-related databases) for the types that countries 
use to describe their preferential trade deals, one realizes that in addition to the above types, there 
are several more: economic partnership agreements, closer economic relations agreements, 
framework agreements etc. However, categorization of “real world” agreements is complex, and 
not only because of these additional types. Even when agreements are classed as in table 1, the 
coverage more often than not differs from what the textbooks suggest it ought to be. For example, a 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) liberalizes not only trade in goods, but also 
services, investment, government procurement etc. In terms of coverage, it is closer to a common 
market than the free trade area, even though it does not have harmonized laws or common external 
tariffs. The same applies to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). That is why EFTA 
categorizes itself as an “advanced free trade area”.
13 Similarly, the Australia – New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), also classified as an advanced FTA, covers 
a broad range of areas.
14 On the other hand, many FTAs do not even attempt to eliminate all tariffs 
on trade in goods, not to mention other trade and non-trade barriers, or areas of trade. If standard 
terminology were used to the letter, these agreements could only be classified as preferential clubs, 
in principle outlawed by GATT through the MFN clause.  
 
Taking into account the complexity in the categorization of agreements arising from real 




                                                 
13 EFTA Secretariat, 2006, “EFTA Bulletin – EFTA Free Trade Relations”, p.10. See also Glossary of Terms on the 
APTIAD website at http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad. 
14 In addition, it is possible that members proceed with deepening integration by skipping some of the levels. For example, 
Australia and New Zealand have been reported as discussing a “single economic market”, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006). 
15 Some commentators are much more selective in terms of classification of PTAs. For example, Goode (2005; p.2) 
excluded all partial scope agreements, concluded by some economies under the Enabling Clause, from the PTA category. 
He claimed that even though these agreements were often called FTAs, members typically sought to address only a 
limited range of specific issues. Goode held that these agreements fell outside the broad-based free trade agreements that 
meet the requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT. He also said, “some economies prefer to conclude Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and other economic cooperation agreements as a first step towards free-
trade agreements. Such agreements typically do not contain any market access provisions, although they often establish 
mechanisms for the promotion of trade liberalisation. None of these agreements fall, however, in the category of 
preferential trade arrangements.” APTIAD at present lists these types of agreements: framework agreement, free trade 
agreement, customs union, non-reciprocal agreement, and preferential trade agreement. “Framework agreement” category 
includes economic partnership, TIFA and similar.  
 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Table 2: Taxonomy concordance for “real world” PTAs 
  Shallow integration  Intermediate 
integration 
Deep integration 
Category  Partial reduction 






































In force or 











±  ±    ±  ±   Thailand-NZ 
Free trade area      +         AFTA 
Advanced free 
trade area 
    +    ±  ±   ANZCERTA 
















Economic union     +  +  +  +   na 





Note: ± indicates partial commitments towards achieving the respective target; + indicates full commitments; area = agreement. 
 
Source: Bonapace, T. and Mikic, M. “Freeing Trade in Asia-Pacific: comparative analysis of bilateral and regional trade agreements” presentation for ESCAP 
Development Seminar, 28.10.2006 mimeographUNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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1.2 About the literature on PTAs 
The literature on trade liberalization, both unilateral and preferential tracks, and on 
regional economic integration, is extremely rich. As Baldwin (2006) states, literature covers the 
economic, political science, international law and business aspects of regional integration and it is 
too vast to review in any detail, even in a book-length text. In fact, even providing a 
comprehensive overview of surveys on regional integration would be quite a task! The only 
approach, therefore, is to recommend references of more recent and comprehensive reviews 
mentioned in Baldwin (2006), Crawford and Fiorentino (2005), the World Bank (2004) and 
others.  
 
A search of the website http//scholar.google.com for the use of specific terms related to 
preferential trade in titles of books and journal articles published between 1951 and 2006 
provides additional insight (table 3). It appears that the turning point was around the early 1980s. 
Before that, researchers mostly mentioned CUs, free trade areas (agreements, arrangements) and, 
somewhat reluctantly, regional economic integration. This may have been result of the 
developments with actual arrangements of that time in Europe (EFTA as a free trade area and the 
European Economic Community as a CU) as well as official GATT language used in Article 
XXIV. 
 
Table 3: Preferential trade and interests of academia 














Preferential trade arrangement  0  1  0  1  58  121 
Preferential trade agreement  0  2  11  22  121  408 
Preferential trade area  1  2  0  38  159  163 
Subtotal  1  5 11 61  338  692 
 
Free trade area  164  349  241  270  3 300  6460 
Free trade agreement  6  12  41  432  7 960  11500 
Free trade arrangement  0  6  13  34  123  228 
Subtotal  170  367 295 736  11  383  18188 
 
Customs union  245      441  457  514  2 330  3 240 
          
Regional trade agreement  0  0  0  2  104  476 
Regional economic integration  7  66  98  123  1 180  2150 
Sub-total  7  66  98  125  1 284  2 626 
 
Unilateral liberalization  2  1  0  14  271  432 
 
Multilateral liberalization  10  20  2  14  277  554 






(ITO)  6 4  9040  21100 
TOTAL  545 1107  904  2622  25808  46954 
Source: Search at http://scholar.google.com on 9 August 2006 and 26 February 2007. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
   
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 9 of 59 
 
During the 1980s, increasingly more research attention was given, at least based on the 
choice of terms used in titles, to different approaches to trade liberalization in addition to the 
orthodox custom union and free trade area.  The mention of unilateral and multilateral 
liberalization in publication titles increased significantly from 1991 onwards, in parallel with the 
practice of countries turning to negotiating free trade and other agreements in order to manage 
their trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the most used term in recent time was WTO. This can be 
attributed also to a number of academic courses with major or sole WTO focus offered since late 
1980s by leading universities around the world. 
1.3 Stylized facts  
   There are five stylized facts about the Asian and Pacific approach to preferential trade 
that can be used in organizing the discussion that follows: 
 
(a) The process of regional integration in earnest started in the 1990s, more precisely during and 
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (figure I). Only one trade agreement dates back to 
1975: the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), formerly known as the ‘Bangkok 
Agreement’. Other agreements predating the 1990s are Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA, 1983) and the Association of South 




(b) There is a strong preference for BTAs as 71 per cent of agreements in force fit into this 
category. Of those BTAs, 77.5 per cent are between two economies in the region and 22.5 of 
so-called cross-continental scope. There are 11 agreements (12.6 per cent) between a country 
and a bloc, and as many RTAs (11 or 12.6 per cent). While RTAs are greatly outnumbered by 
the bilaterals, they do have relatively large membership (on average, 8.8 economies);  
 
(c) When negotiating BTAs, there is a strong preference for naming a legal text as an FTA but the 
spirit of provisions is often not removed from the level of a PTA (in effect); 
 
(d) Multiple memberships are the norm. Most ESCAP members and associate members
17 have 
signed multiple agreements. Only one ESCAP-cum-WTO member remains unattached to any 
of the trading blocs. In contrast, most ESCAP members, who are not WTO members, are 
members of at least one and up to 11 PTAs. The average number of agreements per ESCAP 
member is 5.6. Overlapping memberships arise from parallel BTAs and RTAs for the same 





                                                 
16 Feridhanusetyawan, 2005 (p.14), stated that “ASEAN was established during the Cold War to maintain peace and 
security in the region, and the formation of AFTA in 1992 kept ASEAN relevant when the Cold War ended.”  
17 This paper focuses on regional members and associate members of ESCAP throughout the analysis but reference in 
the text is made to ESCAP members for simplification purposes. Non-regional members of ESCAP are France, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States of America. Their agreements are not covered in the analysis 
unless signed with one or more regional members, e.g. United States - Singapore FTA is included, while United States- 
Jordan FTA is not.   UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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PTA all PTA in force PTA under negotiation Cumulative all Cumulative in force Cumulative under neg  
Source: APTIAD, February 2007  
Note: 1971-1975 – Bangkok Agreement, now APTA; 1981-1985 – ANZCERTA and SPARTECA. 
 
 
(e) BTAs in force focus on industrial goods, while RTAs might have slightly broader but equally 
shallow approach to trade liberalization. The extent of tariff liberalization is variable and the 
rules of origin are protectionist across all agreements.  
 
This paper does not seek to explain in detail the proliferation of BTAs and RTAs in the 
region in the past decade (figure I). There were different factors at play. Some strongly believe 
that regionalism flourished because governments realized that BTAs and RTAs allowed for a 
faster, more tailored approach to specific country needs and were more flexible in terms of 
implementation time and inclusion of the behind-border measures. Another explanation refers to 
the political and strategic motivations, which enhanced intraregional cooperation during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. Yet another factor associated with the spread of regionalism is the so-
called “domino effect” that increases the incentive for countries to join existing agreements (the 
“follow the crowd” effect), which explains why so many governments will engage in the process 
of BTAs and RTAs negotiation. Bonapace and Mikic (2005 and 2007-forthcoming) addressed 
these and other factors driving the proliferation of PTAs in the region in the past decade. 
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2. TRENDS 
2.1 Increasing the density of the Asia-Pacific preferential trade 
Figure IIa illustrates the so-called “spaghetti bowl” or, possibly a more fitting term for 
Asia and the Pacific, “noodle bowl” view of the preferential trade routes in this region. It shows 
the entanglement of bilateral and regional free trade and other types of agreements that are in 
force. There are about 40 more that are being negotiated, and many more that are considered in 
either political or policy circles (some analysts mention up to 200 differently developed 
cooperative agreements to be related to Asia and the Pacific economies). Figure IIb illustrates 
both the trade agreements in force and those that are under negotiation – a simple visual test that 
shows how density will increase as these agreements become signed and implemented.  It is quite 
appropriate to describe this state of affairs as a “motley assortment” (Baldwin, 2006). It is 
therefore easy to understand why commentators suggest that instead of easing trade these 
agreements tend to fragment markets and increase trade costs with adverse effects on trade 
volumes as well as global and national welfare. This paper addresses this issue in the Asian and 
Pacific context. 
 






Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
BTA    RTA   Country –bloc  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, September 2006. 
 
 
The starting point for analysis is to draw the underlying design of preferential trade in the 
region (figure III). Looking at the number of members comprising an agreement, we find that of 
the 87 agreements in force, 62 (71 per cent) are BTAs, and 12.6 per cent comprises of each 
country-bloc agreements and RTAs.
18 Of 62 BTAs, 14 (close to 23 per cent) are cross-continental 
bilateral agreements, leaving 48 (77 per cent) between two countries that are both members of 
ESCAP. Of 11 agreements between a country and an established “bloc”, even six (55 per cent) 
are with ASEAN and three with EFTA (27 per cent). Of all RTAs, nine (82 per cent) comprise 
membership from ESCAP only, while two (18 per cent) include non-ESCAP members.
19 Zhai 
(2006) commented that BTAs were preferred because of their lesser costs in terms of negotiation 
                                                 
18 RTAs have an average of 8.8 members with ASEAN FTA in Goods (AFTA) and in Services (AFAS) counted as two 
RTAs; if only AFTA is counted, average membership is 9.7. 
19 Both are remnants of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
BTA    RTA   Country –bloc   Under negotiation  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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and enforcement efforts. While this might hold for every individual member of the BTA, the 
resulting costs for all BTAs might easily be higher compared with all RTAs. Bonapace (oral 
comm.) argues that this could be because of the lack of “peer pressure” as well as institutional 
framework often missing from the BTAs but built-in the many RTAs. Feridhanusetyawan (2005) 
held that the faster increase in BTAs than in RTAs (plurilateral agreements) contributed to a 
complexity of the picture as many of those BTAs arose “within and across different regional 
agreements”.  
 
Furthermore, looking at the types of agreements that countries form (taxonomy laid out in 
tables 1 and 2), most agreements in both the bilateral and regional categories are free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and framework agreements. Among 62 BTAs there are 50 (or 80 per cent) 
listed as FTA, and 7 (11.3 per cent) as framework agreements. The rest include preferential 
trading agreements (four, making 6 per cent) and one is a non-reciprocal agreement. In contrast, 
14 cross-continental BTAs include 8 (57 per cent) of FTAs, 4 (28.6 per cent) of FAs and 2 other 
agreements. In the category of country-bloc PTAs, structure is very different with more than half 
being framework agreements (55 per cent), and rest made up of FTAs (36 per cent) and one 
customs union (EC-Turkey). The results for RTAs show a combination of the previous two class 
of agreements: there is one CU (EAEC) and four PTAs (within category ‘others’), four (36 per 
cent) of FTAs and two FAs (18 per cent).  
 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Source: APTIAD, February 2007;  
Note: the number does not add to 87 as there are 3 other agreements not shown (1 global, and 2 country-
plurilateral) 
R = intra-regional bilateral agreements 
XC = cross-continental bilateral agreementsUNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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2.2 Much ado about nothing – trade agreements without trade? 
The objectives of trade agreements, as set out in legal documents and texts of the 
agreements, include expanding trade, promoting investment, developing economic integration, 
establishing regional cooperation and coordination, promoting human rights and democracy, and 
improving security (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005). Newer agreements in particular are trying hard 
to broaden coverage of commitments from liberalization of merchandise trade to behind the border 
provisions in trade and other areas of cooperation. In many instances, as mentioned above, 
members have broad concessional aspirations; to reflect them, the members increasingly name 
agreements as “economic partnerships” or “closer economic relations” rather than FTAs.   
 
Notwithstanding this intent to liberalize beyond trade in goods, in many cases it takes long 
transition /implementation periods for any real liberalization to take effect and to be reflected in the 
changed trade flows. It is not rare for the agreements to consist only of the agreement (often called 
a framework agreement) to start negotiation on cooperation or trade liberalization. Some anecdotal 
support exists for the claim that countries sometimes only intend to initiate regional cooperation 
without much commitment with regard to trade or even economic objectives. This practice 
introduces unnecessary trade discrimination to foster regional cooperation in areas that might not 
even require trade preferences, such as recognition of regulatory regimes, exchange of information 
and infrastructural provisions (cf. Schiff and Winters, 2003, p. 264). The cost of achieving such 
cooperation is then much higher than necessary (and sometimes even more than the benefits 
accrued through cooperation). Furthermore, it leads to “trade negotiation” fatigue that sometimes 
tends to be cured by reducing efforts in multilateral trade negotiations, which are perceived as more 
difficult.  
 
This section provides some additional information on intra- and extra-regional trade flows 
and trade dependence to enable a better understanding of the potential impacts of preferential trade 
agreements. The expectation that members have is that PTAs will help boost mutual trade (of those 
products awarded (more) liberal trade treatment) over and above the growth of their total trade.  
 
Total trade of ESCAP members has increased in absolute terms and today accounts for 
almost 30 per cent of world exports and imports (figure IV and table 4). The value of their 
intraregional trade increased (figure IV) dramatically from 1980 to 2005 in absolute amounts. 
Starting with slightly smaller value of intraregional trade than NAFTA in 1980, by 2005 the Asian 
and the Pacific region had surpassed NAFTA and had closed the gap with the EU15 intraregional 
trade from 4/5 to 1/3. However, as a share in world trade Asia-Pacific intra-regional trade remained 
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  Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE data 
 
 
This growth in intraregional trade can be combined with an indicator of trade dependence 
to tell us more about “fortress building” attitude of trade agreements. As table 4 shows, total trade 
dependence,
20  which is a contribution of total trade to the region’s collective gross domestic 
product, increased by coefficient 1.7 over this time. Similarly, an indicator showing only the 
contribution of extra-regional trade to the region’s gross domestic product grew by slightly less 
than the total trade dependence (coefficient of 1.64 over the same 10 years). Despite small 
difference, this points to an increase in the reliance on intraregional trade by ESCAP economies, 
giving support to a claim of “appearance of the third mega trading bloc” to join the European 
Union and NAFTA. Thus, intraregional trade is growing in both the absolute and relative sense. 
However, no fall in trade with the rest of the world makes it difficult to identify this trend of 
growing intraregional trade as trade diversion. Furthermore, a reliable measure of a link between  
the increase in intraregional trade and the existence of preferential trade, that is, BTAs and RTAs is 
still missing. Also, does trade growth among members of the agreements precedes or follows 
preferential agreements? These questions remain high on the list of future empirical research topics.
 
21 
                                                 
20 This indicator is often interpreted as “trade openness”. See Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998, pp.12-15).  
21 See also Mayda and Steiberg (2007) for lack of evidence for an across-the-board new trade creation in response to 
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Table 4: ESCAP trade performance basics 
Group  1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004  2006***
Total trade as a 
percentage of  world 
trade 
26.81 27.77 24.78 27.31 26.91 29.17 29.4 
Intraregional trade as a 
percentage of  word 
trade 
13.02 13.29 10.99 12.74 12.88 14.45 12.9 
Total trade dependence  27.39 33.05 35.34 39.36 39.69 46.46  .. 
Extraregional trade 
dependence 
14.07 17.24 19.27 20.32 19.99 23.28  .. 
Total number of BTAs* 
in force  6 17 22  26  30  46  73 
Total number of RTAs 
in force 
4 5 6 6 6 8  11 
Members with 
membership in GATT/ 
WTO  
20 22 24 25 26 27  28** 
Regional members  and 
associate members 
involved in PTAs  
41 44 44 44 45 49 50 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD and WITS, August 2006. 
Note: * includes cross-continental BTAs; ** Viet Nam accession process finalized in 2006, but it formally 
acceded 30 days after completion of  internal ratification process, i.e. on 11 January 2007. Tonga’s accession 
process was finalized in 2005, but ratification is pending; *** GDP figures not available for 2005 and 2006, 
and trade figures refer to 2005 
 
Table 5: Trade of BTAs and RTAs in force, 2005a 
  Share in total ESCAP 
trade (%) 
Share in total world 
trade (%) 
BTAs (61 BTAs)  16.2 4.7 
- Regional (33 BTAs)  6.6 1.9 
- Other (28  BTAs)  9.6 2.8 
RTAs (11 RTAs)  13.2 3.9 
- Regional (6 RTAs)  10.2 3.0 
Total preferential trade  29.4  8.6 
Total ESCAP trade    29.2 
Memorandum items: 
- Total ESCAP trade (US$ billion) 







Source: Computed using APTIAD and COMTRADE data, February 2007. 
a Where 2005 trade data are unavailable, the most recent available year is used.UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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 Box I    The Network of Global Trade 
 
 
Project International network Archive based at the Princeton University, USA has produced some interesting mapping of work trade. Figure 
shows how actual global and regional trade linkages changed from 1980 to 2001. The thicker the lines plotted between trading partners, the more 
intensive their mutual trade (in terms of percentage of total world trade); where the percentage is less than 0.3, no line is drawn. In the 1980s, most 
of the world trade took place between the European Union-12/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (EU-12/UK) and the United 
States, and between the United States of America and Japan. Neither of these two groups/countries had any trade agreements. There were also 
noticeable links between the EU-12/UK and former Commonwealth of Independent States on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other, but it was 
oil trade that drove that linkage. Within Asia, the only trade larger than 0.3 per cent of world trade was between Japan and Indonesia, again driven 
by oil trade, not by a trade agreement. 
 
By 2001, the network of trade had changed drastically. The network then assumed a shape of a triangle with the base being trade between the 
United States and the EU-12/UK (again, not based on a trade agreement), and the other two sides comprising trade between the United States and 
Japan plus other Asian economies as well as Japan and those Asian economies and the EU-12/UK. Within Asia in 2001, the trade network also took 
on a more branched-out shape, with the strongest linkages between Japan and China, and China and Hong Kong, China. Of course, in 2001, there 
was no trade agreement among any of those countries. Therefore, it appears that actual trade does not necessarily arise out of the existence of trade 
agreements but are the results of spontaneous workings of markets. Often raising trade flows will precede the agreements and provide the rationale 
for signing the agreements.  
 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
   
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 19 of 59 
Figure V. shows total trade among the members of each one of the 10 RTAs in the region 
in 2005. AFTA leads with almost USD300 billion worth of intra-bloc trade but members of APTA 
are not much behind. It is however not possible to assert how much of this trade in any of the blocs 
is done under the preferential terms negotiated (in that sense the bubbles present the maxima). 
Identification of the share of trade associated with the establishment of the preferential trade area is 
still one of the most tedious empirical trade research (cf. Mayda and Steinberg, 2007). 
 











Size of bubbles reflects trade 
in USD thousands in 2005
 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD 
 
In 2005, as table 5 shows, slightly less than 30 per cent of total ESCAP trade was 
associated with BTAs and RTAs; this amounted to less than 9 per cent of world trade. While close 
to 60 per cent of PTA-linked intraregional trade was done my members of the BTAs, more than 
half of that was linked to BTAs that had one extra-regional member (e.g., the United States, 
EU/EFTA etc.). This might indicate that there was still a great deal of untapped potential for 
developing intraregional trade linkages among ESCAP members.  
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3.  SHAPES: UNDERSTANDING MULTIPLE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The previous analysis discovers yet another important asymmetry. From 1994 to 2006, the 
number of all agreements in force expanded from 10 to 87, or a more than eightfold increase (see 
Table 4). Of the total 58 ESCAP regional members, the number of those involved in this 
proliferation of agreements increased from 41 to 50 during the same period, or 51 including the 
USA.
22  This indicates multiple memberships and a significant overlap in the membership of 
agreements. One country ended up negotiating with another under several unrelated framework 
agreements. As an example of this option, figure VI portrays agreements (only related to trade) 
linking India and Sri Lanka. The oldest is APTA (1975), by type a preferential agreement, currently 
among six members. Other regional agreements include BIMSTEC (1997) and SAARC 
(1985)/SAPTA
23 (1995) and SAFTA
24 (2006) agreements among the same members. In addition, a 
bilateral FTA exists between India and Sri Lanka (2001).  
 
A review of the agreements does not indicate that they have the same rules of origin, or the 
same approach to liberalization in trade of goods, services, customs procedures or dispute 
settlement (see Annex Table 1). Thus, even in this example of two countries, it is possible to infer 
how trade costs might be increasing because of the opaque rules covering trade between India and 
Sri Lanka. This is not to argue that trade cannot flourish in this environment – figure VII, which 
illustrates exports and imports of India to and from Sri Lanka since 2001, clearly shows that it can. 
Sri Lankan exports to India increased fivefold from 2001 to 2004. Imports in the same period only 
doubled. The issue, however, is that with multiple agreements one does not know which particular 
set of rules drives trade growth or which set might act as an obstacle. In the India-Sri Lanka case, 
while it is plausible to associate trade growth with the 2001 FTA, it is important to be able to 
identify any contribution by other agreements. The question should also be asked whether an even 
larger increase in trade could have been achieved with fewer agreements and, arguably, lesser costs. 
Lastly, one should not ignore the impact of unilateral liberalization processes in both countries. Sri 
Lanka started to simplify and lighten its protective regime in late 1970s, and by late 1980s 
unilateral trade liberalization was reflected in sharp growth of trade, as shown in figure VII. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Non-regional members are France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America. This leaves only three ESCAP members (Mongolia, Palau and Timor-Leste) and five ESCAP 
associate members (American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands) not 
involved in preferential trade at present. Only Mongolia is also a World Trade Organization member.  
23 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation/ SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement. 
24 South Asian Free Trade Area. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Figure 6: India-Sri Lanka “naans” 
 
























































Export of Inida to Sri Lanka Import of India from Sri Lanka Total imports  of Sri Lanka Expon. (Total imports  of Sri Lanka)
SAFTA
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Multiple and overlapping membership is not isolated to these two countries; it is spread 
across the region. Only eight ESCAP members and associate members are not involved in PTAs 
process (Mongolia, Palau and Timor-Leste among the member and American Samoa, French 
Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands from the associate members list). 
It appears that signing and implementing between one and three agreements is either most 
beneficial, most popular or the easiest, as 21 countries implement from one to three agreements 
(seven in each category). Implementing more than three agreements is more demanding and the 
number of countries managing to do so decreases sharply as the number of agreements increases 
(see trend line in figure VIII, panel a). The maximum number of agreements per single country is 
implemented by Singapore (19), followed by Thailand (14), India (13), Malaysia (12) and Turkey 
(12). The average number of agreements per country, not counting those countries without any 
agreements, is 5.6.  
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Panel a – Agreements in force 
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Panel b – All agreements  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
 
 
When the same analysis is done using the total number of agreements then the picture changes only 
slightly (Figure VIII, panel b) as now more countries is associated with  larger number of 
agreements. The average number of agreements per country, again excluding the eight without 
agreements, is 7.  
 
Closer inspection of multiple memberships reveals the following: 
(a)   The economies with one agreement in force, except Hong Kong, China and Macao, China 
are small island developing countries, which have yet to be more fully integrated into the 
trading system (most are not members of WTO) or regional trade. 
(b)  Countries with two agreements, with the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
comprise Pacific island countries, and the two agreements to which they are signatories are 
the regional FTA (PICTA) and the non-reciprocal agreement with Australia and New 
Zealand (SPARTECA). 
(c)   Countries signatories to three agreements can also be described as only partially integrated 
into trade: three are LDCs (Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal), three Pacific Island states (Fiji, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and Azerbaijan. 
(d)    Countries with four to six agreements comprise a mixed bag of developed economies 
(Australia, Japan and New Zealand are all in this group) high income developing countries 
like Republic of Korea as well as economies with longer experience in trade like 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Several transition economies, which use the trade 
agreements mainly to preserve historical economic and trade linkages, also belong into this 
group.  
(f)    Countries with 10plus agreements are very heterogeneous. Transition economies form 
dominantly BTAs with economies that were previously parts of the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics in order to maintain trade linkages. Turkey obviously follows the trade 
policy of the European Union and uses BTAs with single countries of existing blocs to UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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integrate better into the existing spaghetti bowl of the European Union. Malaysia and 
Thailand, two members of AFTA, follow almost identical paths, with some PTAs being 
tied to AFTA linkages with large traders in Asia and the remaining bilaterals pursued with 
countries considered of strategic importance. Malaysia has BTAs with Japan, Pakistan and 
the United States, while Thailand has so far signed BTAs with Australia, Bahrain, India 
and New Zealand. In addition, there is an old framework agreement with the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic dated 1991, and membership in BIMSTEC FTA from 2004. Again, 
there is a membership overlap with regard to India and Thailand having not only a BTA (in 
process of negotiation) and membership of BIMSTEC but also a bilateral agreement 
between India and AFTA, of which Thailand is a member. There is also double 
membership with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, one through a BTA and another 
in AFTA.  A separate BTA with Japan is also in negotiation phase even though there is an 
agreement between Japan and AFTA thereof Thailand is a member. Figure IX illustrates 
these overlaps very clearly. India, however, is the winner in terms of overlapping 
memberships.  We already showed the case with Sri Lanka, and with Thailand. 
Furthermore, India has BTAs with almost all countries that are also members of 
SAPTA/SAFTA and BIMSTEC as well as with most members of APTA and some of 
AFTA. This is shown in figure X. The important question and not discussed in this paper is 
about economic and political reasons for a country to negotiate parallel and seemingly non-
related agreements that include the same subset of members? 
(h)  Singapore leads with 19 agreements in force. Seven of these are bilaterals with various but 
mostly high-income economies (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and 
the United States) and some strategic developing countries such as India and Jordan. Other 
agreements contain a plurilateral with Brunei Darussalam, Chile and New Zealand, a 
bilateral with EFTA and a number of  agreements related to the ASEAN FTA. A small 
degree of overlap appears in the case of deals with India (the Singapore–India BTA and 
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Figure 9: “Padthai”  with PTAs of Thailand 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, August 2006. 
 
 
Figure 10: Leader in multiple memberships 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, August 2006. 
Overlapping raises a number of issues. Membership in a number of different PTAs by a 
given country can result in the duplication and maintenance of tariff schedules for each preferential 
partner, with different phase-out periods. The more PTAs a country participates in, the greater the UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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potential for criss-crossing tariff concessions and rules of origin. Multiplicity of rules of origin 
often leads to conflicting criteria for the granting of origin, with an adverse effect on volume of 
trade.
25 
This raises the cost of negotiating, implementing and administering such agreements as 
mentioned above. The problem is not only in the dedication of human and financial resources to the 
negotiation and maintenance of overlapping and multiple PTAs. Given the limited resources of 
many countries, this certainly may divert attention from negotiations at the multilateral level. 
Nevertheless, there are positive sides to engaging in preferential liberalization, as passionately 
argued by Trejos (2005) who also held that bilateral negotiations were essential to break deadlocks 
that eventually occur in multilateral negotiations.  
Recent calls for “policy space” needs of developing countries in relation to the current 
multilateral trade negotiations and other market-liberalizing reforms (for example, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2006) are not made in the context of trade liberalization 
through BTAs and RTAs. Since this “policy space” is not much more than ability of a country to 
slow down/postpone trade and other liberalization reforms in one or more sectors, it might be 
implied that BTAs and RTAs could be negotiated in such a way to cater for this interest better than 
the multilateral negotiations. The question remains as to whether this also meets the long-term 
development objectives of the country as a whole. Even if policy space secured through a carefully 
negotiated BTA or RTA were desirable, a multiplicity of agreements with different countries with 
“similar-but-not-identical” rules would eventually infringe upon this space more than would a 
single set of identical rules for many countries. Even when the existence of such agreements can be 
justified by non-trade objectives, one should explore possibilities for replacing them with 
alternative non-trade cooperation agreements, which bear lesser trade cost. 
  
The difficulty in sustaining membership in two or more overlapping plurilateral PTAs (for 
example, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Thailand) should lead to the consolidation of PTAs and 
rationalization among participants who may be forced to align themselves with one or other 
regional grouping. Harmonization in the granting of tariff concessions and in rules of origin can 
significantly reduce the administrative burden associated with membership in multiple RTAs 
covering trade in goods. This scenario becomes even more complex if a country is involved in 
multiple RTAs covering trade in services, given that the harmonization of regulations across a 
number of preferential agreements presents an even greater administrative challenge.  
 
                                                 
25 For example, A. Trejos, 2005, stated that “a large number of similar-but-not-identical bilateral agreements can involve 
high administrative costs for both governments and companies…they may end up adopting inefficient sourcing and sub-
optimal production practices”. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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4.  DEPTH, SPEED AND COVERAGE OF LIBERALIZATION 
 
There is a simple test for determining whether an agreement is efficient or “good” – it must 
create trade for the members of the agreement without diverting trade from the rest of the world 
(ROW).
26 The literature over time has also identified the conditions under which the net trade 
creation would be more likely. The World Bank (2004) summarizes these as:
27   
•  Number and type of members. More members with dissimilar economies is preferable to 
fewer homogenous economies; 
•  MFN tariffs faced by ROW. Lower MFN tariffs after the formation of agreement will 
minimize trade diversion; 
•  Coverage in terms of measures, sectors and products. A negative list with as few 
exemptions as possible is preferred, and with reduction/elimination of all border trade 
barriers in a short period of time; 
•  Rules of origin. Flexible, transparent and liberal allow for more trade creation; 
•  Measures to facilitate trade. Inclusion of areas and measures beyond good trade will 
facilitate cross-border competition and permit more trade creation.
28  
 
How do Asian-Pacific trade agreements measure against those conditions? We comment on 
them in turn, starting with summarizing conclusions of the already discussed first point .  
4.1 Membership 
As discussed in section I, most (precisely, 71 per cent) of the region’s large number of 
trade agreements in force are bilateral. The largest share of those agreements pair together 
developing economies (or transition economies). Less then 30 per cent are between two “diverse 
economies”, e.g., developed and a developing economy. On the other hand, even though there is 
only a small share of RTAs in the region, on average they comprise about nine members; this 
would go some way towards meeting the criteria on large memberships.  
 
Taking into account the fact that around 40 agreements are being in the process of 
negotiation only in this region, and that most of them include one or more of the major trading 
economies of the region (or world), closure of those negotiations might bring global efficiency 
improvement in line with this condition on numbers and types of members. This improvement 
would arise because of the increasing number of countries able to generate trade creation would be 
leaving the “outsiders” camp and entering the camp of “regional partners” (thus reducing the 
potential for trade diversion, ceteris paribus). However, this extension of membership cannot 
happen automatically because typically existent agreements are designed as “closed clubs”. For 
example, most RTAs in the region remind closed for the current members or future members of the 
association underlying the trade agreement (ASEAN in case of AFTA, BIMSTEC in case of 
BIMSTEC FTA, ECO for ECOTA, SAARC for SAFTA and the South Pacific Forum for 
SPARTECA). Only two agreements allow for expansion through direct members in the trade 
agreement: APTA only to the developing members of ESCAP, and PICTA to any state or territory. 
Even with open access to membership, the efficiency-improving outcome would be more clear-cut 
in case of parallel consolidation of these agreements under harmonized enforcement rules. 
                                                 
26 This is, of course, dramatic simplification. Trade creation and trade diversion should reflect changes in welfare that are 
sourced through replacement of inefficient with more efficient production among the partners (trade creation) and the 
opposite in relation to the ROW (trade diversion). As static measures of welfare changes, they do not reflect all efficiency 
changes that could be arising from RTAs. Needles to say, it is problematic to derive general conclusions based on partial 
equilibrium analysis.  Calculation of trade creation and trade diversion is complex and is not among the objectives of this 
paper.  
27 GATT Article XXIV stipulates some of these in form of “WTO compliancy”.  See in particular para 5 (a), (b), (c), 8 (a) 
and  (b). Similarly GATS Article V para 4. 
28 As trade facilitation in the regional PTAs is a theme of a separate working paper it is not discussed here (see IIBE&L, 
2006). Competition provisions in PTAs of ESCAP are summarized in annex table 4 but are not discussed in this paper.  
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Additionally, it is necessary that the agreements satisfy other conditions, particularly the extent of 
liberalization. 
4.2 MFN tariff levels 
 
Table 6 demonstrates trends in unweighted average applied tariff rates in most of the 
countries in the region. It is true that most countries show declining average tariff rates. This is a 
result of combined working of the following forces: 
(a)  Multilateral trade negotiation of the Uruguay Round and accession to WTO; 
(b) Preferential trade liberalization; 
(c)  Unilateral trade liberalization efforts that many economies in the region have followed 
since the early 1990s.  
 
 

























1 Bangladesh      26.7 26.7 21.3 21.2  19.3  19.9  18.8  16.4  16.8 
1 Bhutan  17.5 15.3 15.4 15.4 15.4  15.4  17.7      22.2  22.2 
1  Cambodia  35.0    18.0  18.0  17.0  16.5 16.1 16.0 15.6     
1 India  37.0 34.2      32.4 32.7  30.9  28.3      28.3  16.0 
1  Kyrgyz  Republic      4.6  4.5  8.2  4.3       
1  Lao PDR  9.5      9.5  9.3  9.6        9.4  9.2 
1  Mongolia   5.0     4.9  6.9  6.8  4.9  4.9  4.2 
1  Myanmar  4.5 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.7  4.6  4.6  4.6  4.4  4.5 
1 Nepal  14.8 17.3 21.7 14.2 14.2  14.7  14.6  14.8  14.8  14.7 
1 Pakistan  41.7 46.6 45.6 24.1 23.6  20.2  17.2  16.8  16.2  14.3 
1  Papua New Guinea  20.7  20.4     20.0  7.1  7.1  7.2  6.1  6.1  5.7 
1 Solomon  Islands  **  22.7 45.0 24.0 24.0 22.7  22.7  22.7  22.2       
1  Tajikistan  **    8.3 5.0 5.0 8.0  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.0     
1 Uzbekistan  21.0 21.0 29.0 29.0 29.0  10.4  10.6           
1 Viet  Nam    13.0 13.0 15.6 15.1  15.0  14.3  13.8  13.6  13.1 
2  Armenia      5.0  3.7  4.3  3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 
2 Azerbaijan      12.0 12.0 12.0  10.8  9.8  10.1      10.0 
2 China  22.0 16.7 16.6 16.3 16.2  15.2  12.3  10.5  9.6  9.0 
2 Fiji  **  12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4  12.4  12.4  8.3  8.8  7.9 
2  Georgia     10.0  10.0  9.9     9.7  9.8  7.6  7.4    
2  Indonesia  10.8        9.9  7.8  6.1 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.5 
2  Iran, Islamic Rep. of    28.0  30.0  30.0  37.4  30.0  27.3  18.9  17.7    
2  Kazakhstan **  10.0  9.3  9.5  7.8  7.8  7.9  7.9          
2  Malaysia  8.4 8.9      8.2 8.0  7.5  7.5  7.4    7.5 
2  Maldives  20.8    22.0  22.0  21.3  21.1 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.2 
2 Philippines  14.0 12.7 10.4  9.5  7.1  6.9  5.3  4.5  5.5  5.4 
2 Russian  Federation  11.2 14.0 13.9 12.6 11.1  10.7  10.3        10.0 
2  Samoa **     18.0  18.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0       
2  Sri  Lanka    19.6  11.1  10.9  9.3  8.9 8.9 8.7 9.9  10.8 
2  Thailand         16.9  16.4  14.4     13.5     9.9 
2  Turkey  7.0 6.7      7.2 3.2  3.1  2.6  2.7      2.5 
2  Turkmenistan    0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5  5.4  5.3         
2  Vanuatu     29.0  22.8  22.8  22.8  22.8  17.0  13.8       
3  Brunei  Darussalam  3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  3.1  3.0  2.9  3.1  3.1 
3  Hong  Kong,  China  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3  Macao,  China  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3  Singapore  0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4  Australia  6.8 6.6 6.2 5.9 5.6  5.3  5.0  5.0  5.1  4.2 
4  European  Union    3.0 2.4 2.9 3.6 2.2  3.1  1.7  1.7  2.5  2.5 
4  Japan  2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.7 
4  Korea,  Rep.  of  9.7 9.2 9.7 9.5 9.4  9.3  9.1  8.9  8.6  8.6 
4  New  Zealand  6.3 6.0 4.7 3.9 3.0  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.8 
4  United  States  4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.6  3.5  3.7  3.3  3.1  3.0 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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(142)  17.9 17.7 16.5 14.8 13.7  12.4  12.1  10.5  11.9  10.2 
1 Low  income  (56)  22.4 21.5 20.3 17.9 15.3  13.7  14.0  11.9  13.3  12.1 
2 Middle  income  (86)  13.0 14.3 13.9 12.5 12.3  11.3  10.6  9.6  10.0  8.7 
                       
   3 
High income non-
OECD  (14)  0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8 
   4 
High income OECD 
(10)  5.5 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.4  4.6  4.3  4.2  4.3  4.1 
                                   
Source:  extracted from  Francis K.T. Ng, 2006, Data on Trade and Import Barriers, World Bank 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/tar2005.xls) 
Notes: All tariff rates are based on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates, or applied rates, or MFN rates 
whichever data is available in a longer period. Tariff data is primarily based on UNCTAD TRAINS database and then used 
WTO IDB data for gap filling if possible. Data in 1980s is taken from other sources. 
** Tariff data in these countries came from IMF Global Monitoring Tariff file in 2004, which might include other duties or 
charges. 
Country codes are based on the classifications by income in WDI 2006, where 1 = low income, 2 = middle income, 3 = high 
income non-OECD countries, and 4 = high income OECD countries. 
 
With respect to MFN tariffs faced by ROW after the conclusion of the agreements, it is 
difficult to acquire exact and reliable data. The fact that among the regional RTAs there is only one 
partially functioning customs union (EAEC) means there is no real threat from creating high 
common external tariffs. Figure XI shows the level of average applied tariffs of 10 RTAs (AFAS 
not included) calculated from table 6  in 2005 for 2005 or in the most recent year when 2005 was 
not available (Annex figure 1 shows individual countries in each of the 10 RTAs). This average 
ranges from 7.5 per cent for AFTA to 16.6 per cent for SAFTA. SAFTA is also the only RTA in 
which all individual members’ averages stand at above 10 per cent, while in AFTA only Cambodia 
and Viet Nam have over 10 per cent average applied tariff.  APTA on average has slightly higher 
protection than the RATS taken together mostly because relatively high averages of Bangladesh 
and India.  
 























Simple average of applied tariffs (%)
 
Source:  Calculated by the author from data in Table 6. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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4.3 Approaches to tariff reduction in PTAs 
How important is the contribution of preferential trade liberalization to opening of a 
country? As noted above, declarative aspirations of all agreements are to transform trade among 
partners into duty-free trade. In many agreements, in fact, this is expressed as an ultimate goal; 
however, partners are taking many different routes to achieve this end. Table 7 summarizes the 
difference in approaches to tariff reduction in the enforced agreements that provide this information. 
A positive list approach is considered, in principle, less liberalizing and it consists of members 
agreeing to the list of products on the (positive) list whose tariffs will be reduced or eliminated. A 
negative list approach assumes a reduction/elimination of tariffs on all products except on those 
that are included in the negative list. This approach is closer to the spirit of GATT, even though it 
may often include a long list of excluded products. Another important factor is the determination of 
a base tariff rate as a benchmark for reduction. In most cases, the MFN-applied rates are used for 
this purpose (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005, p.16). In an effort to comply with the WTO rules on 
regional agreements, most of them contain an intention to eliminate tariffs within what is 
considered a reasonable period. When an LDC is involved, it is provided with either longer 
transition periods (e.g., AFTA) or lesser or no reduction commitments (e.g., APTA). Another 
interesting feature, and supporting previous claims about “made-to-measure” agreements, refers to 
asymmetrical reciprocity in tariff reduction even when there is no LDC involved. 
Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p.17) describes how, in the Singapore-United States FTA, which 
follows “negative list approach” the United States kept tariffs on about 8 per cent of  products over 
the transition period of eight years, while Singapore eliminated all tariffs immediately, binding 
them to zero. In the Singapore-Japan FTA, which follows a positive list approach, Singapore again 
reduced all tariffs to zero immediately while Japan committed to eliminating its tariffs gradually 
over a 10-year period.  
 
Table 7: Tariff reduction approaches in BTAs and RTAs in ESCAP 
PTAs  Positive list Negative list 
All  in force with information available 31  33 
 
BTA 22  25 
Cross-continental plurilateral  0  1 
Country-bloc 3  2 
RTA 5  5 
Global 1  0 
 
FTA 20  29 
Framework agreement  4  1 
Preferential trading arrangement  6  2 
CU 0  1 
Non-reciprocal arrangement  1  0 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
  
  Most of the products included in the negative lists (or excluded from the positive lists) 
belong to categories of agricultural products.
29  
 
                                                 
29 ARTNeT study “Agricultural Trade: Planting the seeds of regional Liberalization in Asia” reflects this selectivity and 
weak liberalization in both the South Asian and the South-East Asian PTAs explored (forthcoming).  See also Pasadilla 
(2006) and Samaratunga, et al (2006).  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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4.4 Rules of origin 
The current proliferation of agreements has spun a complex rules-of-origin web (table 8). 
Not only does each agreement have its own rules of origin; in addition, a bewildering array of 
product-specific rules of origin is emerging. Adopting the less restrictive rules of origin could 
result in significant trade deflection and redundancy of a trade agreement, while adopting the most 
restrictive rules of origin may result in no trade taking place under the agreement. Several chances 
have been missed, at both the WTO and regional levels, to bring some uniformity to the 
formulation of preferential rules of origin. GATT Article XXIV, quite remarkably, is silent on the 
use of preferential rules of origin. Should rules of origin not be viewed as other regulations of 
commerce that should not raise barriers to third countries any higher than they were prior to the 
formation of the PTA? The most that is said is embodied in a non-binding common declaration on 
principles.  
 
This increases the urgency of establishing an overarching, region-wide, common 
framework of principles, guidelines and procedures to which BTAs and RTAs would be anchored. 
Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the point of departure should be the WTO common 
declaration. Ongoing work, notably in APEC, and other useful trade and development elements 
found in other agreements should be built on. For example, APTA recently agreed to common rules 
of origin (representing a wide spectrum of industrial development among the members) that are 
relatively simple, general and liberal – i.e., a flat rate of a minimum 45 per cent of local value 
content (35 per cent for least developed countries) in bilateral rules of origin, and at least 60 per 
cent (50 per cent for least developed countries) of regional content with full cumulation (cf. 
Baldwin, 2006).  
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Table 8. Rules of origin provisions in selected trade agreements 
 
Source: Compiled from table 2 in Bonapace and Mikic, 2006, and APTIAD. 
 
Consolidation of multiple membership agreements around more liberal rules of origin will 
serve as a tool for diminishing noodle bowl-related costs of trading under preferential regimes. One 
such example is provided with recent consolidation of bilateral trade agreements among the 
Southern European countries and a replacement by the common rules as part of an amended 
CEFTA deal. The new Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) consolidates 32 bilateral 
free trade agreements into a single regional trade agreement. The free trade area shall be 
established in a transitional period ending at the latest on 31 December 2010. New consolidated 
agreement replaces the network (aka spaghetti bowl) of bilateral free trade agreements to improve 
conditions to promote trade and investment by means of fair, clear, stable and predictable rules. 
The agreement consolidates and modernizes the region’s “rule book” on trade and includes modern 
trade provisions on issues such as competition, government procurement and protection of 
intellectual property. It facilitates convergence of relevant trade-related rules, notably with regard 
to industrial and sanitary-phytosanitary rules. A simplified single system of rules of origin (and 
other rules) makes it easier to trade within the region. Increased trade is necessary to promote 
growth, job creation and reduced youth unemployment. It is foundation for stability and peace. 
Such harmonization and simplification of rules of origin in the subregions of Asia could contribute 
to deepening of integration, as they are associated with increase in “seamless production”. 
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4.5 Going beyond goods trade
30 
  Many of the newer initiatives declare intention to go well beyond reduction/elimination 
of tariffs and NTBs, including anti-dumping and safeguards, harmonization of competition policies 
and standards, and customs; however, a large number still just remain a collection of aspirations 
towards liberalization that tend to be associated with a longer negotiations process. In addition, 
despite these intentions to go deeper than trade integration, there is only an occasional mention of 
the formation of a CU or a common market in the Asian-Pacific region.
31 Furthermore, while in the 
context of multilateral liberalization a number of countries strongly argue for more freedom in 
movements of labour (referring to Mode 4 liberalization), when it comes to BTAs and RTAs only 
few address this area. A comparison of BTAs/RTAs of this region to existing deals in the Americas 
also illustrates a type of reluctance to negotiate all-inclusive comprehensive agreements. Instead, 
trade agreements are often accompanied by separate agreements on services, investments, 
intellectual property protection, customs procedures etc. Most of the new agreements cover trade in 
services (but pre-General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] agreements still have separate 
agreements on trade in services, such as the ASEAN FAS).  
  Most of the newer agreements could be described as WTO-plus agreements as they 
extend concessionary coverage beyond multilaterally agreed disciplines – such as government 
procurement, competition policy and the environment. This is true for trade agreements between 
developed economies and between developed and developing economies (Lesher and Miroudot, 
2006).  
The overview that is provided in figure XII only shows whether a concessionary 
commitment has been made in particular sectors or not. In order to provide a better assessment of 
the beyond-the-goods commitments, a more detailed analysis of the legal texts of the agreements is 
required. In the following discussion, just one step is made in that direction, as most of the 
individual sectors would need to feature as topics of separate working papers. The analysis is 
necessarily descriptive and incomplete, so this should be taken into consideration when making any 
inferences. The following sectors or areas of concessionary provisions are reviewed: 
•  Intellectual property protection 
•  Investment 
•  Mobility of labour 
•  Services 
 
It is important to note that most agreements mention most of the above sectors as well as 
many others, when describing objectives of the agreement (typically in the preamble of the 
agreement text). However, a significant number of agreements only include a statement of intention 
to negotiate liberalization in certain areas. These agreements have been excluded from the scope of 
this study because they do not count for “substantive commitments”.  
                                                 
30 Some of the agreements do not have legal texts publicly available and/or in English and therefore might not have been 
captured properly in counting the sectors covered. Turkey typically signs agreements that cover more than goods area but 
all of its partners are outside the ESCAP region.  
31 Such as the already cited “single economic market” of Australia and New Zealand. In the zenith of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, there were also calls for the establishment of a currency union. They were later merged into proposals for 
an East Asian Community. 
 UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
   
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 34 of 59 
 






























































Labour mobility Competition Gov. procurement Services Trade facilitation IPR Investment
All agreements RTAs  
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
 
4.5.1  Intellectual property protection 
Intellectual property (IP) protection is required in order to maintain the necessary levels of 
investment in research and development of new products, materials and technologies, so that 
economies can continue to grow. By the time of negotiations for the Uruguay Round, it was 
established that the then members of GATT were applying significantly different systems of IP 
protection. It was also found that trade could be used to effect the transfer of goods or technology 
without allowing for proper appropriation of returns by innovators or holders of IP rights. 
Consequently, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
was negotiated under the same Round. The areas covered in TRIPS include copyrights, trademarks 
and service marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of 
integrated circuits, and trade secrets or other undisclosed information. The TRIPS Agreement was 
built on the existing Conventions under the World Intellectual Property Organization. Since the 
Uruguay Round, the TRIPS was amended on 6 December 2005 by transforming a “waiver” related 
to generic versions of patented drugs in poor countries into a permanent amendment. In addition to 
this amendment, TRIPS has been receiving a great deal of criticism from many quarters.
32 
Notwithstanding this dissatisfaction with TRIPS at the multilateral level, investigation in the 
ESCAP region shows that countries became active in negotiation of IP provisions in the “beyond 
the goods” liberalization.   
 
Annex table 2 provides more details on how trade agreements in this region deal with the 
IP protection. Table 10 summarizes these findings. Of 87 agreements, only 1/3 cover IP. Of the 28 
agreements that do cover IP, nine are associated with Turkey as it prepares its negotiation of 
accession to the European Union. Thus, in a more narrow sense, only 19 regional agreements cover 
IP. BTAs dominate these agreements. Only two RTA extend coverage to IP; in fact, one of them is 
a separate agreement – i.e., the ASEAN FTA has no parts dealing with IP. However, in 1995, the 
ASEAN countries signed the so-called Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation. 
                                                 
32 Among others, J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, 1996, vol. 1 and vol. 2; K. Maskus, 2000; and C. Fink and K. Maskus, 2004. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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As AFTA was signed in 1992, prior to the Uruguay Round conclusion, this Framework attempts to 
fill the void left in AFTA with respect to IP. It is significant that most of the agreements covering 
IP with respect to their type fit into the FTA category. Nine BTAs, two country-bloc, one each the 
RTA and “other” category include an IP provisions part. All of the Turkey’s agreements were 
notified to the WTO, s well as all of the bilateral FTAs. Preferential trading agreements and FA are 
slow to be notified in general. Annex table 2 shows additional information on coverage, with 
agreements split into two categories. One, called “broad coverage”, reflects the intention of 
partners to cover not only IPRs in the strict sense, but also the transfer of technology. Most often, 
this broad coverage is qualified with a reference to being “in line with TRIPS”. It is more difficult 
to judge the nature of obligation from these agreements. A cursory reading of the legal text 
indicates that most agreements commit to “substantive obligations” (instead of cooperation 
activities).   
 
Table 9: Summary of treatment of IPR in trade agreements in the region 
Type of agreement   Total 
FTA  FA  CU  Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 19*  16 (7)  1  -  2 17  (7) 
Country-bloc 6**  3 (1)  2  (1)  - 5  (3) 
RTA 2  1  -  -  1 2 
Other 1 1        
Total 28(9)  21 (8)  3  (1)  3 24(10) 
 Source: Annex table 2. based on APTIAD 
( ) = Number of agreements involving Turkey. 
* Includes seven BTAs between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Israel, 
Romania and Tunis. 
** Includes one agreement between Turkey and EFTA , and one between Turkey and the European Union. 
4.5.2  Investment
33 
Much has been written on the role of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and national FDI 
laws in creating a sound investment climate to attract investment on a long-term basis. Much less is 
known on the impact of the investment provisions within trade agreements. In general it is believed 
that unless a PTA is in full compliance with the principles of an open trading regime, it is more 
likely to increase costs and uncertainty for foreign investors, and thus hinder investment and FDI 
inflows. Thus, a multiplicity of investment “rules” emanating from PTAs may have similar effect 
as multiplicity of rules of origin – to fragment markets rather than to integrate them. 
 
Asia and the Pacific host 33 trade agreements that contain investment provisions (see 
summary in Table 11 and details in annex table 3). Four of those are between Turkey and its 
partners outside this region. Out of these agreements, again, the majority fits in the BTA category 
(19). Most of those are BTA (17, all of which were notified to the WTO). Most of the countries 
with such provisions also have BITs among themselves. One of  the much needed research at 
regional level is a thorough examination of countries BITs commitments and those extended 
through the PTAs. Aim of such an exercise would be to create a regional common framework for 
‘preferential’ investment rules that will be based on a more integrated approach between trade 
liberalization and the treatment of FDI.
34 
 
                                                 
33 This section is an excerpt from  Bonapace and Mikic, 2006, Section 3.2.2, Investment rules. 
34 See Bonapace and Mikic, 2006, section 3.2.2 for an introduction to this examination. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Table 10: Summary of treatment of investment provisions in trade agreements in the region 
Type of agreement    Total 
FTA  FA  CU  Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 23*  17 (4)  5  -  1 17  (4) 
Country-bloc 6  2  4  -  - 3 
RTA 3  2  1  -  - 1 
Other 1 -  1  -  - - 
Total 33*  (4)  21 (4)  11  -  1 21  (4) 
Source: Annex table 3 based on APTIAD. 
( ) = Number of agreements involving Turkey. 
* Includes four BTAs between Turkey and Bulgaria, FYROM, Romania and Tunis. 
 
4.5.3  Mobility of labour and GATS Mode 4 
It is generally recognized that while temporary labour mobility as a mode of delivery of 
traded services accounts only for about 1 per cent of total services trade, remittance flows and 
export earnings derived from this trade by a number of countries in the region are often not 
replaceable with any other form of trade. For some countries, it has become important for building 
a long-term competitiveness as well as a more equitable distribution of income. Since multilateral 
trade negotiations have not produced much progress in this area, particularly given the context of 
“war on terrorism”, PTAs are the only remaining option, barring the bilateral migration treaties 
(mimicking BITs).   
 
Table 11: Summary of treatment of labour mobility provisions in trade agreements in the region 
Type of agreement   Total 
FTA  FA  CU  Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 8  7  1  -  - 7 
Country-bloc 1  -  1  -  - - 
RTA 2  1  1  -  - - 
Other 1 1  -  -  - - 
Total 12 9  3  -  - 7 
Source: Annex table 5 based on APTIAD. 
 
In determining an optimal allocation of resources to maximize welfare at a global level, 
economic theory does not differentiate among resources, and labour migration is in fact treated in 
the same way as capital movements.
35 When discussing the trade-investment nexus and related 
complementarity vs. substitutability issues, one typically concludes that modern production chains 
require investment in its complimentary role to trade, while the conservative role of investment as a 
substitute to trade is increasingly weakening. These two linkages are easy to discover in the trade-
labour movements nexus too. In fact, it is because of the substitutability relationship that, in many 
instances, developed countries were “investing” in an increased trade with (some) developing and 
transition economies in the expectation that this would result in less mobility. However, modern 
production and connectivity probably increasingly strengthen the complementary link between 
trade and labour mobility, with the pooling of more and more labour movements.  
 
Following on from the above analysis, it suffices to say that PTAs could replace stalled 
multilateral negotiations in this area. Many trade agreements negotiated by developed countries 
such as the United States or the European Union already feature provisions for liberalization in the 
so-called Mode 4 of service delivery. Among the Asian countries, Singapore is probably the 
                                                 
35 A word of caution is required: this theory treats capital as productive capital (machinery) and does not cover portfolio 
or short-term capital. Does that mean that labour equivalent would be only a permanent migration, while temporary 
movements (a la portfolio capital) would need to be left out?  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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champion in pushing for this area to be included in bilateral trade negotiations (already having it in 
its 6 FTAs with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and the USA) and in a plurilateral Trans-
Pacific SEP. Table 13 provides a summary of basic features of 12 agreements containing labour 
mobility provisions in the region (see also annex table 4). It reveals that most of the agreements are 
bilateral FTAs. 
 
An inspection of the provisions related to freer movements of natural persons in those 
agreements finds that typically liberal norms apply to four categories of business persons (business 
visitors, short-term service suppliers, professionals
36 and intra-corporate transferees) for periods 
varying from one month to eight years. These provisions are not linked to satisfying any pre-
conditions (e.g., labour market testing or economic needs tests) except for the restrictions 
scheduled with regard to each service category. Additionally, mutual recognition of qualifications 
remains problematic as, in many instances, it is left for the future after the PTAs have come into 
force. Even when negotiations on these mutual recognition agreements (MRA) begin, all countries 
tend to include only a narrow list of occupations – typically those where testing is normally 
required, e.g., accountants, auditors, architects, medical doctors and nurses, dental services and 
veterinary services. Notwithstanding the slowness of this process, it is evident that it is on the right 
path. One way to proceed could be to identify a set of core qualities for professional education and 
have them recognized region-wide. Then each national qualification authority can examine a 
national system against these regionally accepted norms. In the end, we will have a list of 
occupations for persons with degrees obtained anywhere in the region, with full flexibility for 
allowing them to work anywhere in the region where their services are in demand. (They could be 
even issued a regional mobility visa, similar to the APEC business visa). 
 
This, however, will not solve the problem of unskilled workers or providers of services 
such as domestic care, construction work, environmental services etc. Since these providers do not 
necessarily need a specific qualification, their movement is not regulated (neither liberalized nor 
restricted) through existing PTAs. The challenge, therefore, remains in incorporating common 
provisions dealing with liberalization of unskilled workers’ service provision.  
4.5.4  Services 
  Liberalizing services markets is difficult regardless of the path of liberalization but 
empirical literature so far does not provide much evidence that regional liberalization is more 
successful than the multilateral one. On the contrary, it seems that PTAs do not secure more 
liberalization than the GATS and that “[w]hen countries are not ready to liberalize their services 
sectors, the minimum pledge is to bind their PTA commitments in the GATS” (Feridhanusetyawan, 
2005, p.24). This means that in many cases, regional services trade liberalization is hot air and not 
really making an impact on the expansion of services trade among the member countries. 
Champions of regional services trade liberalization are high(er)-income countries in the region, e.g., 
Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and, of course, the United States. Table 14 provides a 
summary of 24 trade agreements with services chapters tracked in APTIAD.
37  Even ¾ of these 
agreements fit into BTA category and almost all of those are FTA. Only two RTAs cover services, 
one is AFAS, a separate agreements of ASEAN members, and another (BIMSTEC) which is only 
at a level of aspiration as it is yet to become operational (see also annex table 5).  
 
 
                                                 
36 Agreements typically list specific occupations to be granted preferential treatment; these include IT engineers, and 
medical, accounting and architecture professionals.  
37 More precisely, there are 23 trade agreements and a separate Association of South East Asian Nations Framework 
Agreement on Services in force, but many agreements that are being negotiated mention services. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Table 12: Summary of treatment of services provisions in trade agreements in the region 
Type of agreement   Total 
FTA  FA  CU  Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 18  17   1  -  - 14 
Country-bloc 3  2  1  -  - 3 
RTA 2 -  2  -  - - 
Other 1 1  -  -  - - 
Total 24  20  4  -  - 17 
Source: Annex table 4 based on APTIAD. 
 
  Belmann (2006), and Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) contrasted two approaches to 
regional service trade liberalization – the United States- or NAFTA-like approach and the GATS or 
Japanese approach (see table 15 for details). Some of the trade agreements analyzed fit into the 
“NAFTA” mode with negative list approach (e.g. Singapore-US, Singapore-Australia and 
ANZCERTA), and others follow GATS positive list approach (Singapore-Japan, Singapore – New 
Zealand, or AFAS) with some countries being in both camps. Obviously, the preference of the 
partner with “stronger” bargaining power determines the approach taken in the bilateral agreements.  
Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) find that the PTAs that involve the US have a more comprehensive 
coverage in terms of services sectors and contain deeper levels of commitments than the PTAs 
involving other members. There is no doubt that preferential services trade liberalization is one 
area where much further home-grown research would be desirable. 
 
Table 13: Two approaches to preferential services trade liberalization 
 
NAFTA type or United States model 
 
GATS type or Japan model 
• Special chapter on cross-border supply, 
telecomunications, financial services, e-
commerce, mode 4 and investment. 
• Special chapters on investment, 
mode 4 and e-commerce. 
• Negative list approach.  • Positive list approach. 
• Negative list in investment chapter. 
• Mode 4 restricted to business persons.  • Mode 4 covers business persons 
independent professionals (limited) 
and contractual service suppliers 
(limited). 
• Air transport or maritime transport 
services are excluded. 
• Air transport and maritime transport 
services are excluded. 
• Stand-still clause for non-conforming 
measures. Any autonomous reform is 
automatically incorporated into the 
agreement (ratchet mechanism). 
• Stand-still clause. Autonomous 
reform not automatically 
incorporated into the agreement. 
• Does not allow the possibility of leaving 
a sector, measure, mode of supply or 
regulatory situation unbound. 
• Allows for the possibility of leaving 
a sector, measure, mode of supply or 
regulatory situation unbound. 
Source: C. Belmann, 2006. 
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4.5.5  ‘Best practice’ principles summary
38 
‘Best practice’ principles are increasingly used in analytical work. This task is by no means 
straightforward. The term best practices is fraught with value connotations. Even the legally 
binding and internationally adopted GATT Article XXIV is known to be “creaky” and “extremely 
elastic”. At worst it has been described as  “full of ambiguities”, “a contradiction” and “a failure, if 
not a fiasco”. Perhaps that is why it was often disregarded, if not in letter, then in spirit by the 
members. Yet it constitutes the best available approximation of how a “good” or “best practice” 
preferential trade agreement, should be designed so that they can be complimentary in their impacts 
to the multilateral trading system.  
 
Following on the analysis above, table 16 summarizes basic information on the approach 
each agreement takes with regard to tariff liberalization, sectoral coverage and treatment of WTO 
and WTO+ issues. In addition to policy-content recommendations from the GATT Article XXIV, 
we also draw on principles emanating from trade theory and econometric models as well as 
empirical findings to come with the set of ‘best practice’ principles (second column of the table). 
The third column contains information compiled for “real world” agreements (as already explained, 
the information was compiled for only those agreements for which a legal text was available in an 
updated and electronic format in English). A comparison between the two columns not only shows 
what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in Asia and Pacific, but more specifically 
highlights the gap between reality and ‘good practice’ or model agreements. While most 
agreements aspire towards an eventual “free” trade area (typically 10-15 years down the road), 
increasingly, countries are settling for framework agreements that are lacking in operational details. 
Typically, and more so for agreements between developing countries, they are short on modalities 
of implementation, lack agreement on rules of origin, with little known on what recourse is 
available in the case of disputes arising from non-compliance. These agreements thus appear to be 
signaling that free trade and trade integration is perhaps not the core issue at stake. Governments 
may be using the format to put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-trade-related) 
areas that often have strategic political and foreign policy objectives as the driving forces.   
Consequently, the general reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise 
trade is tempered by the willingness to expose other sectors and policies (notably WTO-plus) to 
preferential liberalization and regulatory reforms.  
Table 14. Comparisons of the “best practice” and actual trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific  
Area  Aspiring state of 
affairs (best 
practice) 
Current state of 
affairs (actual 
agreements) 




goods trade- listings 
and coverage 
Full liberalization 
taking place at 
enforcement of the 
agreement or with 
short transition period 
based on negative 
listing and covering 
both tariffs and NTBs 
Liberalization based 
on positive more than 
on negative listing; 
full liberalization over 
longer transition of 10 
years  
*24 BTAs and RTAs 
with positive listings 
* 6 BTAs and  RTAs 
with negative listings 
*22 BTAs and RTAs 
with  liberalization 
implemented on either 
positive or negative 
listing  (incl. 12  with 
“full” elimination) 
Rules of origin  Simple and 
transparent in style; 
low and symmetrical 
in terms of demand; 
consistent across all 
agreements 








                                                 
38 Part of this section was prepared by T. Bonapace and M. Mikic as a background study for the ESCAP Survey 2007 
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Comprehensive 
coverage of the “other 
than goods” sectors 
Comprehensive scope 
accounting for all 
sectors with 
exclusions necessary 
only for appropriately 
designed policy space 
Only smaller share 
(rarely more than 1/3) 
of agreements include 
preferential 
commitments in the 
“other than goods” 
areas; coverage is 
variable and far from 
comprehensive  
See Figure XXII for 
breakdown of 
agreements covering 





with the WTO dispute 
settlement  whenever 
possible 
Only 1/3 of 
agreements cover DS 




*17 BTAs and 4 
RTAs cover this area 
in more details 
Consistency and 
compliance with the 
WTO 
Notification to the 
WTO and  regular 
update of non-
members; open for 
accession of third 
parties 
About 1/3 of the 
BTAs and RTAs are 
not notified to the 
WTO 
*20 BTAs and 4 
RTAs are not notified 
Transparency  Making full text 
available to all 
partners in English 
and electronically 
Some countries do not 
publish (original 
and/or updated) 
electronic versions of 
the legal texts of the 
agreements in English 
on the Internet   
About 10-15% per 
cent of the agreements 
lack updated 
information  
Source: compiled by the author from the APTIAD, November 2006 and Goode (2005) 
 
5.  MAKING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 
TO COMPLEMENT MULTILATRAL TRADING RULES
39  
 
Since there is no doubt that preferential trade will remain one of preferred trade policy 
options, there is a need to turn towards designing them in a way to work complimentary to 
multilateral trading system. There in no harm of repeating that this in the first place implies 
maximization of benefits from PTAs (trade creation) and minimization of their costs (trade 
diversion). Furthermore, whenever possible PTAs should be aiming for WTO+ level of integration 
thus going beyond the expected level of multilateral liberalization, not coming short of it. Without 
ambitions to provide “how to” manual for trade negotiators
40, this section outlines the four areas of 
issues most relevant in negotiating preferential trade liberalization agreements: why (including with 
whom and for whom), what, how and at what cost.  
5.1 Why preferential trade, with whom and for whom?  
Preferential trade agreements may offer “some appropriate solutions to national policy 
needs, they may confer credibility on policy regimes, help to solve political problems or increase 
competition” (Schiff and Winters, 2003, p.261). There are, however, many other situations where 
trade agreements unnecessarily increase the economic price payable for non-economic (and 
uncertain) gains and/or increase the costs of an inappropriately chosen trade liberalization path.  
Therefore, even before approaching the agreement design and negotiation phase, a difficult policy 
                                                 
39 This section was used for T. Bonapace and M. Mikic background study for the ESCAP Survey 2007. 
40 See for example “Negotiating Skills Manual – Market Access in an Economic Partnership Agreement”, Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex or Goode (2005).  UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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choice facing policymakers is whether to enter into negotiations and if yes, with whom. The 
following, represents a non-exclusive, list of questions that need to be posed and answered prior to 
entering into negotiations: 
1)  Why is the proposed trade agreement with a particular trading partner(s) important to the 
economy, i.e. is it mostly motivated by 
a.  Needs to enhance goods trade  
b.  Needs to enhance services trade and /or foreign direct investment  
c.  Needs to ensure support for overall economic reform (as a stability anchor) 
d.  Needs to enhance political and security cooperation. 
2)  Is it not possible to obtain the same results through other liberalization tracks (unilateral, 
multilateral)? 
3)  Are there any sectors and social strata in the economy which might be particularly 
adversely affected by the agreements and what are the planned measures to ease those 
effects? Will this require excluding such sector(s) from the agreement?  
4)  Which are the sectors that will benefit? Are direct transfers between winners and losers 
possible so to ensure a more equitable distribution of the gains from trade? 
5)  Are the likely post-facto production structure, employment, revenue and other socio-
economic welfare effects in consonance with the objectives of a long term development 
plan for the economy? 
 
Obviously the above and similar questions can be answered only if proper analysis of the 
agreement’s potential effects has been undertaken. A first step in the preparation of any changes in 
economic and social policy must therefore be a rigorous analytical preparation, including securing 
sound and reliable statistics and other (soft) data. APTIAD’s extension in performance indicators is 
potentially helpful tool in such analysis. 
5.2 What design? 
Design of the agreement should be modeled on the above discussed ‘best practice” or 
model designs. The arguments for the above list are contained in a long list of literature on 
preferential trade liberalization published over 50 years, including the most recent ones like 
Baldwin (2006), Limão (2006), Plummer (2006) and Zhai (2006). They all (from different 
approaches and using different techniques of analysis) tend to support the finding that preferential 
trade “as is now” probably impedes multilateral liberalization and has ambiguous welfare effects 
on participating and non-participating members. However, with a corrective action preferential 
trade can be made complimentary to the multilateral system and their implementation can 
contribute to development. These actions should include, inter alia: 
-  minimizing positive listing approach as “limited number of sectors and sequencing issues 
could lead to important adverse effects on effective protection and other indirect efficient 
effects (Plummer, 2006, p.3) 
-  maximizing the diagonal cumulation in rules of origin which will allow defragmentation of 
production and multilateralization of regionalism (Baldwin, 2006), 
-  deepening the regional integration to allow for more positive effect for freeing global trade 
(Zhai, 2006). 
5.3 How? 
In terms of the negotiation process, policymakers should be prepared to stay the course on 
the long haul. Besides the need for long term planning, this requires the setting up an administrative, 
legal and judicial institutional structure with the requisite human resource expertise. However, the 
best policy-making is perhaps that one which is based on a full understanding of the domestic 
economy, and the transmission mechanisms through which changes in trade policy work their way 
through the economy. A quantitative estimation of the effects of possible liberalization scenarios, if 
based on sound theoretical constructions of models can play a useful role. It is important for trade UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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negotiators and policy makers to factor into their decision-making that gains from liberalization 
come from opening of a domestic market as much as (if not more) from opening foreign markets. It 
is  however crucial to understand that a) gains and costs of liberalization have asymmetrical time 
dimensions, with costs typically appearing much sooner than the gains; and b) effects of a policy 
change cannot be contained to a sector to which they originally apply but do have impacts on the 
rest of the economy. Negotiations will be successful if an agreement is implementable with net 
gains for the economy and this can be achieved only if before, during and after negotiations, 
policymakers maintain full consultation and information sharing with the stakeholders.
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5.4 At what cost? 
Finally costs cannot be ignored. Proliferation of agreements is expensive. Costs are direct 
and indirect (or opportunity costs). Direct costs arise from a need to adequately finance negotiating 
machinery which – depending on country’s ambitions – could grow into employing significant 
number of skilled people in specialized and more general government departments. Opportunity 
costs have already been experiences at national and global level as the ineffective negotiation in the 
Doha round by many is assigned to inability of number of countries to focus equally on both – 
multilateral and preferential – fronts. There are also other sources of costs as important social, 
economic and political areas could become neglected because of the policy focus on the 
preferential trade negotiations. While it is very difficult to build reliable time-series data for proper 
cost-benefit analysis of trade liberalization negotiations,  experts opinion is that “expenditure 
incurred on such negotiations is regressive with the smaller countries losing a relatively bigger 
chunk out of the total pie of government expenditure for undertaking regional trade ventures” 
(Chadha, 2005, p.3).  
6. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
The late 1990s was a period when Asia and the Pacific were just discovering the 
phenomenon of regionalism as a policy-driven management of their international trade and 
investment. Prior to that time, regionalism had been mostly experienced as a spontaneous process 
(autonomous from policy makers and driven by markets and entrepreneurs). This regionalism was 
also limited to geographical areas where, due to the lack of political relations, policy-led 
regionalism could not have been practiced (e.g., the Chinese triangle). From  Box, which compares 
trade flows in 1980 and 2001, it is clear that trade between China and Hong Kong, China, and 
Taiwan Province of China, (which set the direction for intraregional trade) evolved in a short 
period.  
 
However, recent developments ended this spontaneity – contemporary preferential trade in 
Asia and the Pacific is definitely policy-led and unfortunately often by non-economic objectives 
without wisdom of long-term economic policy design. Notwithstanding the fact that PTAs may be 
completely “appropriate solutions to national policy needs, they may confer credibility on policy 
regimes, help to solve political problems or increase competition” (Schiff and Winters, 2003, 
p.261). However, there are many other situations where PTAs unnecessarily increase the economic 
price payable for non-economic (and uncertain) gains and/or increase cost of an inappropriately 
chosen trade liberalization path. Low (2006) suggests that before preferential trade agreements 
could be harnessed to work for global benefits, the PTAs must multiply to such a degree to increase 
trade costs sufficiently for business sector to “overturn the current and growing mosaic of criss-
                                                 
41 More research is also needed on the best practices in inclusive decision-making in regard to negotiation PTAs. Some 
governments invite public to voice their concerns and interest in a preparatory phase of negotiations. See for example a 
call for public views on the New Zealand- GCC trade negotiations to start later in 2007 at 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Business-gateway/0-NZ-GulfCo-opCouncilFTA-
Publicview.php. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
   
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 43 of 59 
crossing RTAs and move towards a more rational generalized set of arrangements that would come 
back into a multilateral framework.” This is “multilateralizing regionalism” à la Baldwin (2006).
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This paper clarifies what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in Asia and 
Pacific, and it establishes the fact that they vary widely in motivation, form, coverage and content. 
The paper finds that  PTAs in Asia and the Pacific leave much to be wished for in terms of meeting 
established criteria for ‘best practice’ or model agreements. Bilateral agreements are much 
preferred to plurilateral or regional ones, while “free” trade areas/ agreements are the most frequent 
form, but they in most cases push achievement of “free” trade for several years in future. 
Increasingly, countries opt for a partnership or framework agreement – in principle to signal that 
either they mean much more than trade integration or that they really do not mean serious trade 
integration but are using the format to put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-
trade-related) areas. More often, the latter is the case. This probably explains to some degree why a 
number of countries sign multiple agreements with the same partners! Analysis has also discovered 
a reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise trade and to expose other 
than goods trade areas (including WTO plus) to preferential liberalization. A necessary next step is 
to establish empirically if and by how much this chosen format of preferentialism is more costly in 
terms of transaction and implementation costs.  
 
To sum up, often the choice to freer global trade is given through two processes:   
multilateral trade negotiations under the governance of WTO, or a spontaneous process of 
“globalization of regional free trade” (via domino effect). We suggest that the third way, 
increasingly discussed among academics, policy makers, and especially business. It involves the 
creation of a relatively small number of large trading blocs through policy-led consolidation of 
binding rules for series of PTAs (currently with heterogeneous rules) without trade-diverting 
effects for those economies left outside. 
                                                 
42 Cf.  also Bonapace and Mikic (2005), and (2006). See also Batra (2006) for possible options. UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division    Staff Working Paper 04/07 
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Annex table 1. Comparison of rules of origin applicable to trade between India and Sri Lanka* 
 
FTA between India and Sri Lanka  APTA  AFTA 
Determination of origin of not wholly obtained products: 
Article 7.a 
…products worked on or processed 
as a result of which the total value of 
the materials, part or produce 
originating from countries other than 
Contracting parties or of 
undetermined origin used does not  
exceed 65% of the f.o.b. value and 
the process of manufacture is 
performed within the territory of the 
exporting contracting party 
Rule 3 (a) 
…products worked on or processes as 
a result of which the total value of the 
materials, parts or produce originating 
from non-Participating States or of 
undetermined origin used does not 
exceed 55% of the f.o.b. value of the 
products produced or obtained and the 
final process of manufacture is 
performed within the territory of the 
exporting participating state  
Rule 8 (a) (ii) 
…products worked on or processed as a 
result of which the total value of the 
materials, parts or produce originating 
from other countries or of undermined 
origin used does not exceed 60% of the 
f.o.b. value of the products produced or 
obtained and the final process of 
manufacture is performed within the 
territory of the exporting contracting 
state 
(70% for LDC and 65% for Sri Lanka) 
Article 7.b 
Non-originating materials shall be 
considered to be sufficiently worked 
or processed when the product 
obtained is classified in a heading, at 
the four digit level, of the HCDCS, 
different from those in which all the 
non-originating materials used in its 
manufacture are classified  





price b o f
Value Value O M  
Where M= imported non-originating 
materials, parts or produce; and 
O=undetermined origin materials, 
parts or produce  (65% for LDC) 
Rule 8 (a) (i)  
The final product is classified in a 
heading at the 4-digit level of the 
HCDCS differently from those in which 
all the non-originating materials used in 
its manufacture are classified  
 
Article 7.e 
The value of the non-originating 
materials, parts or produce shall be: 
i. the c.i.f. value at the time of 
importation of the materials, parts or 
produce where this can be proven, or 
ii. the earliest ascertainable price paid 
for the materials, parts or produce of 
undetermined origin in the territory 
of the Contracting Parties where the 
working or processing takes place. 
Rule 3(d) 
The value of the non-originating 
materials, parts or produce shall be: 
i. the c.i.f. value at the time of 
importation …where this can be 
proven, or 
ii. the earliest ascertainable price paid 
for…in the territory of the 
participating State where the working 
or processing takes place 
Rule 11 (a) The value of the non-
originating materials, parts or produce 
shall be: 
i)The c.i.f. value at the time of 
importation of the materials, parts or 
produce where this can be proven or 
ii) the earliest ascertainable price paid for 
the materials, parts or produce of 
undetermined origin in the territory of 
the Contracting States where the working 
or processing takes place 
Cumulation 
Article 8 
The value addition in the territory of 
the exporting contracting party shall 
not be less than 25% of the f.o.b. 
value of the product under export, 
and aggregate value addition in 
territory of the contracting parties is 
not less than 35% of the f.o.b. value 
of the product under export. 
Rule 4 
The aggregate content originating in 
the territory of the participating states 
is not less than 60% of its f.o.b. value 
(50 % for the LDC) 
Rule 9 
The aggregate content (value of such 
inputs plus domestic value addition in 
further manufacture) is not less than 50% 
of the f.o.b. value; The domestic value 
contents (value of inputs originating in 
the exporting contracting state plus 
domestic value addition in further 
manufacture in the exporting contracting 
state) is not less than 20% of the f.o.b. 
value; And the final product satisfies the 
condition of change in classification at 
the 4-digit level CTH 
Source: Compiled from respective rules of origin of each agreement downloadable from APTIAD  
* While these two countries are also members of BIMSTEC (other members include Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Myanmar, Nepal, and Thailand), there is no electronically accessible legal text of that agreement and 
furthermore rules of origin are yet to be negotiated so they could not have been included in the above table.  Annex    
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Annex table 2. Treatment of intellectual property protection in trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific 
Title  Scope  Type 
Signed 
Year  In Force  Intellectual Property (Others) 
ASEAN - Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership  Country - Bloc  FA  2003  2004 
Yes. Cooperation activities without 
substantive obligations. Broad coverage 
including information exchange and ICT. See 
more in Art. 5.1(3) of the Agreement. 
ASEAN Free Trade Area   Regional  FTA  1992  1993 
Yes. A separate agreement 
http://www.aseansec.org/6414.htm 
FA on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation between the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations and the 
People's Republic of China  Country - Bloc  FA  2002  2003 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations. 
Coverage broad in line with TRIPS. See 
more in Art. 7 of the agreement. 
United States - Australia FTA  Cross-cont.  FTA  2004  2005 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations. 
Very broad coverage. See more in Chapter 
17 of the Agreement.  
Thailand - Australia FTA   Bilateral  FTA  2004  2005 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations. 
Very broad coverage. See more in Chapter 
13 of the Agreement.  
Economic Cooperation Organization 
Trade Agreement   Regional PTA  2003  2003 
Yes. Cooperation activities without 
substantive IPRs obligations. Broad 
coverage. see more in Art. 19 of the 
Agreement.  
FTA between the EFTA States and the 
Republic of Korea  Country - Bloc  FTA  2005  2006 
Yes. Chapter 7: Articles 7.1 and 7.2, Annex 
XIII- covering areas such as patents, 
trademarks and copyright and using high 
standards for the protection; Article 7.3 on 
cooperation 
FTA between the EFTA States and 
Singapore  Country - Bloc  FTA  2002  2003 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations. 
Very broad coverage. See more in Sec VII, 
Annex XII of the Agreement. 
India - Singapore Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement  Bilateral FA  2005  2005 
Yes. Cooperation activities without 
substantive IPRs obligations. Coverage in 
line with TRIPS and includes scientific 
cooperation. See more in Chapter 11 and 
Arts. 6.1;6.5 and 12.3 of the Agreement. Annex    
 
Mapping preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific    Page 50 of 59 
Japan - Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreement Bilateral  FTA  2005  2006 
Yes. Substantive obligations and 
cooperation. Broad coverage. See more in 
Art.7 of the Agreement. 
Agreement between Japan and the 
Republic of Singapore for a New-Age 
Economic Partnership   Bilateral FTA  2002  2002 
Yes. Substantive obligations and 
cooperation. Coverage in line with TRIPS 
and covers Database Contents. See more in 
Art. 86, Chapter 10 of the Agreement. 
FTA between the republic of Korea and 
Chile Cross-cont.  FTA  2003  2004 
Yes. Substantive obligations and 
cooperation. very broad coverage. See more 
in Part 5, Chapter 16 of the Agreement.  
Agreement between New Zealand and 
Singapore on a Closer Economic 
Partnership  Bilateral FTA  2000  2001 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations. 
Broad coverage in line with TRIPS. See 
more in Part 9, Art. 57 of the Agreement.  
New Zealand - Thailand Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreement  Bilateral  FTA  2005  2005 
Yes. substantive, procedural obligations and 
cooperation. Very broad coverage. See more 
in Chapter 12 of the Agreement. 
Singapore - Australia FTA   Bilateral  FTA  2003  2003 
Yes. Substantive, procedural obligations and 
cooperation. Very broad coverage. See more 
in Chapter 13 of the Agreement. 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (Brunei, 
Singapore, New Zealand and Chile)  Cross-cont. plu  FTA  2005  2006 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations 
and cooperation. Very broad coverage. See 
more in Chapter 10, Art. 16.5 of the 
Agreement. 
FTA between Turkey and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bilateral  FTA  2002  2003 
Yes. Substantive obligations. Coverage 
broad and in line with the TRIPS. See more 
in Art. 20 of the Agreement.  
FTA between Turkey and Bulgaria  Bilateral  FTA  1998  1999 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations 
and cooperation. Very broad coverage. See 
more in Art. 31, Annex IV of the Agreement. 
FTA between Turkey and Croatia  Bilateral  FTA  2002  2003 
Yes. substantive obligations. Broad coverage 
in line with the TRIPS. See more in Art. 27 of 
the Agreement. 
Customs Union between Turkey and the 
European Community  Country - Bloc  CU  1994  1996  Yes.  
Agreement between the EFTA States 
and Turkey  Country - Bloc  FTA  1991  1992 
Yes. Substantive obligations. Coverage in 
line with TRIPS. See more in Art. 15, Annex 
XII of the Agreement. Annex    
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FTA between the Republic of Turkey 
and the Republic of Macedonia  Bilateral  FTA  1999  2000 
Yes. Substantive obligations. Coverage in 
line with the TRIPS. See more in Art. 20 of 
the Agreement. 
FTA between Turkey and Israel  Bilateral  FTA  1996  1997 
Yes. Substantive obligations. Broad 
coverage. See more in Art. 22, Annex IX of 
the Agreement. 
Agreement between the Republic of 
Turkey and Romania  Bilateral FTA  1997  1998 
Yes. Substantive obligations and 
cooperation. Coverage broad. see more in 
Art. 26 of the Agreement. 
The Association Agreement Establishing 
the Free Trade Area between the 
Republic of Turkey and the Republic of 
Tunisia Cross-cont.  FTA  2004  2005 
Yes. Substantive obligations. Coverage in 
line with the TRIPS. See more in Art. 28 of 
the Agreement. 
Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Lao Peoples 
Democratic Republic on Trade Relations  Cross-cont.  PTA  2003  2005  Yes. Chapter II, TRIPS and TRIPS plus 
United States - Singapore FTA   Cross-cont.  FTA  2003  2004 
Yes. Substantive and procedural obligations 
and cooperation. Very broad coverage. See 
more in Chapter 16 of the Agreement.  
Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam on Trade Relations  Cross-cont. PTA 2000  2001 
Yes. Extensively covered in Chapter II. 
TRIPS level Patent and Trademark 
protection (implemented in 12 months) and 
Copyright and Trade secrets protection 
(Implemented in 18 months). TRIPS plus 
treatment in several areas 
 









 Annex    
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Annex table 3. Trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific with commitments on investment 




Force  Mode 3 
ASEAN Free Trade Area   Regional  FTA  1992  1993  No.  
Yes. ASEAN Investment Area 
http://www.aseansec.org/6462.htm 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation between the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations and the People's Republic of China  Country - Bloc  FA  2002  2003  No.   Yes.  
ASEAN -India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation  Country - Bloc  FA  2003  2004  No.   Yes.  
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation Among the Governments of the Members 
Countries of the Association of the Southeast Asian 
Nations and the Republic of Korea  Country - Bloc  FA  2005  2006  No.   Yes.  




obligation Yes.   




obligation Yes.   
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and 
Economic Cooperation   Regional  FA  1997  1997  No.   Yes.  
Free trade agreement between the EFTA States and the 
Republic of Korea  Country - Bloc  FTA  2005  2006  Yes.  
Yes. Agreements on investment separately concluded 
between Rep. of Korea, on one hand, and Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland, on the other. See 
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/ExternalRelations/Partner
Countries/Korea/KR/KR%20Inv%20Agr/KR_Inv_Ag.pdf 
Free Trade Agreement between the EFTA States and 




obligation Yes.   
India - Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 




obligation Yes.   Annex    
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India - Thailand Framework Agreement for establishing a 
FTA  Bilateral  FA  2003  2004  No.   Yes.  




obligation  Yes.  
Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States 




obligation Yes.   
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore 




obligation Yes.   
Free Trade Agreement between the republic of Korea and 




obligation  Yes.  
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of 




obligation Yes.   
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Malaysia  cross cont  FA  2004  2004  No.   No.  
Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a 




obligation  Yes.  
New Zealand - Thailand Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement  Bilateral  FTA  2005  2005  No.   Yes.  
South Asian Free Trade Area   Regional  FTA  2004  2006  No.   Yes.  




obligation  Yes.  Annex    
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Agreement between the Government of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Republic of 




Framework Agreement Between the Kingdom of Thailand 
and the Kingdom of Bahrain on Closer Economic 
Partnership  cross cont  FA  2002  2002  No.  
Yes. Article 5 links provisions with the Agreement 
for the promotion and protection of investments 
signed 21.5.2002 
Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Romania  Bilateral  FTA  1997  1998  No.   Yes.  
The Association Agreement Establishing the Free Trade 
Area between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of 
Tunisia  cross cont  FTA  2004  2005  No.   Yes.  
United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement   cross cont  FTA  2003  2004 
No. GATS-type 
market access 
obligation  Yes.  
Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on Trade Relations  cross cont  PTA  2000  2001  No.  
Yes. Chapter III on Development of Investment 
Relations, Annex I on TRIMs illustrative list. Joint 
ventures with 100% US ownership in 7 years 
from time agreement in force. 
Agreement between the Governments of the United States 
and Afghanistan concerning the Development of Trade and 
Investment Relations  cross cont  FA  2004  2004  No.   No.  
Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement between 
the United States of America and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations  Country - Bloc  FA  2006  2006  No.   No.  
Framework Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America, and the Governments of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan concerning the Development of Trade and 
Investment Relations  cross cont plu  FA  2004  2004  No.   No.  
 
 
Source: Compiled from APTIAD, February 2007. 
 Annex    
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Annex table 4. Treatment of  labour mobility provisions in trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific 




Force  Mode 4 
Labour and Env. 
Standards 
ASEAN -India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation  Country - Bloc  FA  2003  2004  No.   Yes.  
United States - Australia Free Trade Agreement  Cross cont  FTA  2004  2005  Yes.   Yes. Chapter 18 on labor standards. 
Thailand - Australia Free Trade Agreement   Bilateral  FTA  2004  2005  Yes.   No.  
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and 
Economic Cooperation   Regional  FA  1997  1997  No.   No.  
India - Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement  Bilateral  FA  2005  2005  Yes.   No.  
Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for 
the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership  Cross cont  FTA  2004  2005  Yes.   No.  
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for 
a New-Age Economic Partnership   Bilateral  FTA  2002  2002  Yes.   No.  
Free Trade Agreement between the republic of Korea and 
Chile  Cross cont  FTA  2003  2004  Yes.   No.  
South Asian Free Trade Area   Regional  FTA  2004  2006  No.   No.  
Singapore - Australia Free Trade Agreement   Bilateral  FTA  2003  2003  Yes.   No.  Annex    
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Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement 
(Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand and Chile)  Cross cont plu  FTA  2005  2006  No.   Yes.  
United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement   Cross cont  FTA  2003  2004  Yes.  
Yes. Annex 17A United States-Singapore 
Labor Cooperation Mechanism; Chapter 
18 : Environment 
Source: Compiled from APTIAD, February 2007 
 Annex    
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Annex table 5. Treatment of services trade provisions in trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific 




Force  Mode 3   Sectors Covered  Sectors Excluded  
Australia - New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement   FTA  1983  1983  Yes.  
Negative list approach. See sectors 
excluded.  
Australia: Some telecommunications, air and airport 
services, coastal shipping, and some types of insurance. 
New Zealand: Airways services, telecommunications, 
coastal shipping and postal services. 
ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services  Regional  FA  1995  1996  Yes.  
air transport; business services; 
construction; financial services; maritime 
transport; telecommunication; tourism 
MRAs are being negotiated in 
engineering, architecture, accountancy, 
surveying and tourism  No sectoral carve-outs. 
Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic 
Co-operation between the 
Association of South-East 
Asian Nations and the 
People's Republic of China  Country - Bloc  FA  2002  2003  No.  
ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in 
Services signed in 2007 covers a) 
business services, b)construction and 
engineering services, c) tourism and 
travel services, d)transport and 
educational services, e) 
telecommunication services, f) health-
related and social services, g) 
recreational, cultural and sporting 
services, h) environmental services, and 
i) energy services    
United States - Australia 





negative list approach. 
Telecommunications, Financial Services  n.a. 
Thailand - Australia Free 




obligation  Includes a chapter on e-commerce 
Positive list approach to commitments and scheduling. No 
sectoral carve-outs. 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectorial Technical and 
Economic Cooperation   Regional FA 1997  1997  No.   
The parties agree to enter into 
negotiations to progressively liberalise 
trade in services with substantial 
sectoral coverage through a positive list 
approach.  
For trade in services and investments, the negotiations on 
respective agreements shall commence in 2005 and be 
concluded by 2007. Annex    
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Mainland and Hong Kong 
Closer Economic 





Positive list approach for China. See 
Annex IV for sectors covered  No sectoral carve-outs. 
Mainland and Macao Closer 
Economic Partnership 





Positive list approach for China. For 
sectors covered see Annex IV  No sectoral carve-outs 
Free trade agreement 
between the EFTA States 
and the Republic of Korea  Country - Bloc  FTA  2005  2006  Yes.  
Financial services; telecommunication 
services. Positive list approach  Core air transport services carved out. 
Free Trade Agreement 
between the EFTA States 




obligation  Positive list approach.   ACore air transport services carved out. 
India - Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic 





Positive list approach: air services, e-
commerce, media, education  Core air transport services carved out. 
Japan - Malaysia Economic 




obligation  positive list approach. 
Core air transport services and cabotage in maritime 
transport carved out 
Agreement between Japan 
and the United Mexican 
States for the Strengthening 





obligation  Negative list approach.  
Core air transport services, cabotage in maritime transport 
and financial services carved out. 
Agreement between Japan 
and the Republic of 
Singapore for a New-Age 





Specific chapters for cooperation on: 
Financial Services, Information and 
Communication Technology, Tourism. 
Japan uses negative list for national 
treatment for mode 3. 
Classed as a positive list schedulling. See Annex VI for 
Mode 4 limitations. Core air transport services and 
cabotage in maritime transport carved out. 
Free Trade Agreement 
between the republic of 






Negative list approach. Professional 
Services, Telecommunications. Health 
mentioned in cross border services 
(Chapter 11) 
Core air transport services and financial services carved 
out. Annex    
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Free Trade Agreement 
Between the Government of 
the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the 






Negative list approach except for 
financial services for which a positive list 
adopted.  Core air transport services carved out 
Agreement between New 
Zealand and Singapore on a 
Closer Economic 





No specific sector covered in the text. 
Positive list but no carve-out sectors. 
See Annex 2 for limits on mode IV and each party's 
schedule of commitments. No sectoral carve-outs. 
Free Trade Agreement 
Between the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan and the 
Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka  Bilateral  FTA  2002  2005  No.        
Panama - Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement  Cross cont  FTA  2006  2006  Yes.  
Negative list approach except for cross-
border trade in financial services for 
which a positive list adopted  Core air transport services carved out. 
Singapore - Australia Free 




obligation  Financial Services, Telecommunications. 
Negative list approach.Core air transport services carved 
out. 
Agreement between the 
Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Government 
of the Republic of Singapore 
on the Establishment of the 
Free Trade Area  Cross cont  FTA  2004  2005  Yes.  
Financial Services, Communications, 
Transportation 
Positive list approach with some hybrid elements. Core air 




Singapore, New Zealand 
and Chile)  Cross cont plu  FTA  2005  2006  No.   negative list approach 
Core air transport services and financial services carved 
out. Brunei will delay the implementation of the services 
chapter at least two years 
United States - Singapore 





Telecommunications, Financial Services 
(different regulation from other services). 
Negative list approach.  
Negative list approach except for cross-border trade in 
financial service for which a positive list is adopted. Core 
air transport services carved out. 
Agreement between the 
United States of America 
and the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam on Trade Relations  Cross cont  PTA  2000  2001  No.   Positive list approach.   No sectoral carve-outs. 
Source: Compiled from APTIAD, February 2007 